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This thesis compares the changes of civil-military relations during the 
democratization process in South Korea and Taiwan until 2008. It applies Narcis Serra’s 
theory of military reform and civil-military relations. In The Military Transition: 
Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces, Serra argues changes in civil-military relations 
occur along three axes: military professionalism, civilian control of the military, and 
tension between civilians and the military. This analysis shows that military 
professionalism and the civilian control of the military improved in both countries during 
the democratization process, but the degree of improvement in South Korea was higher 
than in Taiwan. Furthermore, the tension between the civilians and the military in Taiwan 
was higher than that of South Korea. The difference in civil-military relations between 
the two countries is attributed to different paths of democratization. In Taiwan, the 
democratization movement was initially less influential than in South Korea. Not only 
was the Taiwanese military more reluctant to reform, but also social pressure demanding 
reform was comparatively weak. In South Korea, the democratization movement was 
more forceful due to regular mass mobilization, while the military was more responsive 
to social pressures.  
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This study compares how civil–military relations developed during the process of 
democratization in South Korea and Taiwan. This research has several meaningful 
characteristics. 
First, this study examines historical similarities and differences between South 
Korea and Taiwan. During the 20th century, South Korea and Taiwan have undergone a 
similar process. Both countries had been invaded by imperialist Japan and have had 
experience fighting against communism. Also, they have had a close relationship with the 
United States. Furthermore, strong authoritarian regimes ruled the countries at the 
beginning of their national development, and since the late 1980s, both countries have 
taken the path of democratization and become successful economic powers through rapid 
economic growth. Specifically, in South Korea, Kim Young-sam was elected as the first 
genuine civilian president after a long military dictatorship. Next, South Koreans 
witnessed their first democratic regime change in 1998, in which Kim Dae-jung was 
elected. His successor, Roh Moo-hyun, was elected in 2003 and served until 2008.  
In Taiwan, during the reign of Lee Teng-hui from 1988, he conducted a top-down 
democratization reform. In 1996, the first direct election by the people was held in 
Taiwan. In 2000, the first democratic regime change took place in Taiwan when Chen 
Shui-bian was elected as the first non-Koumintang president. He was re-elected in 2004 
and served until 2008. Therefore, this study sets 2008 as the end of a democratically 
transformed regime.  
The two countries also have differences, however. Taiwan’s regime (the 
Koumintang) once had a strong dominance in mainland China, but was driven out by the 
Communist Party and moved to the island of Taiwan. The Koumintang forcibly 
controlled the native Taiwanese and maintained martial law until the late 1980s. In South 
Korea, conflicts with North Korea reached their peak during the Korean War. In the early 
1960s, Major General Park Chung-hee set up a military regime by a coup, followed by 
 2 
Chun Doo-hwan’s regime. Martial law did not persist for a long time as in Taiwan, 
however. 
Second, the two countries are prominent examples that have succeeded in the 
transition from authoritarian to democratic government. After the collapse of the Cold 
War, many authoritarian countries attempted to convert to democracy. Some states that 
were authoritarian states, like South Korea and Taiwan, have succeeded in stable 
democratization. Therefore, if many authoritarian countries experience democratization 
in the future, this study could provide meaningful lessons for civil–military relations.  
Finally, despite these characteristics, it is hard to find precedents of comparative 
studies of the civil–military relations between the two countries during democratization. 
In a similar field study, Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn discussed civil–military 
relations between South Korea and Taiwan—along with Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand—in their study “Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia’s New 
Democracies” (2009). In this study, the authors state that South Korea and Taiwan are the 
only countries that have succeeded in securing civilian control of the military in the 
region, while Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand have failed.1 The authors explain 
four causes: “There are historical legacies of authoritarian rule and the path of democratic 
transition, the internal security role of the military, and the relationship between 
development and democratic consolidation.”
2
 In addition, they said that the failure of 
civilian control ultimately results in democratic stagnation in those countries.
3
 In other 
words, Croissant and Kuehn set Taiwan and South Korea as one group and compare it 
with other countries. As a result, there is little comparison of previous research on civil–
military relations in the process of democratization between South Korea and Taiwan. 
Therefore, this study could be a significant precursor in this field. 
This paper will first discuss the main theories of civil–military relations in the 
literature review. After reviewing and summarizing the theories and arguments of 
                                                 
1 Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, “Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia’s New 




distinguished civilian military scholars, this study will select Narcis Serra’s military 
reform theory of the new civil–military relations theory.  
Next, this paper will analyze South Korea. The historical and political analysis of 
the process of democratization in South Korea will be conducted. Then, Narcis Serra’s 
military reform will be used to examine the changes in civil–military relations in the 
process of democratization. After that, this paper will draw the major implication of 
analyzing changes in the civil–military relations during the democratization process of 
South Korea. This paper will then conduct an analysis on Taiwan. Analysis on Taiwan 
will be conducted in the same order as South Korea. This paper will first look at the 
process of democratization, then analyze the changes of civil–military relations, and 
finally draw upon the major implications. After that, this paper will explain the 
similarities and differences of the two countries. The possible causes of the difference 
between South Korea and Taiwan will be looked at in the history of the democratization 
process of the two countries. 
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This chapter looks at the theories of civil-military relations to research a 
comparative study on the development of civil-military relations in the process of 
democratization in South Korea and Taiwan. First, this chapter briefly introduces the 
overall development of the civil-military relations theories. It introduces the classical 
theorists of civil-military relations such as Huntington and Janowitz. After that, this 
chapter will introduce the new civil-military relations theory that emerged recently 
against the existing civil-military relations theory. The new civil-military relations theory 
will be used throughout this study.  
Next, this chapter selects a theory suitable for analyzing the changing process of 
civil-military relations, especially during the democratization process. Specifically, this 
paper uses Narcis Serra’s “Military Reform Theory.” This theory is applied directly to 
the subsequent examples of civil-military relations in South Korea and Taiwan, which 
helps to analyze the similarities and differences between the two countries during the 
democratization process. 
A. OVERVIEW OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS THEORY 
1. Samuel Huntington’s Civil-Military Relations Theory
Civil-military relations refer to “all the relations between military commanders 
and civilian political leaders in the decision-making process of a country.”
4
 The study of 
civil–military relations in modern times was carried out in earnest, with Samuel 
Huntington’s The Soldier and the State. He analyzed civilian control to explain the types 
of civil-military relations. Huntington said that “civilian control is about the relative 
power of civilians and military groups in order to achieve civilian control, the military 
power must be reduced.”
5
4 Harold Stein, American Civil–Military Relations: A Book of Case Studies (Birmingham: University
of Alabama Press, 2003), 23. 
5 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957),
80.
6 
Huntington provides two types of civilian control. One is objective civilian 
control, and the other is subjective civilian control. Huntington argues that “civilian 
control in the objective sense is the maximizing of military professionalism, more 
precisely, it is that distribution of political power between military and civilian groups 
which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among 
members of the officer corps.”
6
 According to this objective civilian control, the roles of
soldiers and politicians are clearly separated. Politicians set up security and defense 
policies and directions, and soldiers plan and carry out military operations to support 
politicians’ decisions.
7
 They respect each other’s territory and do not invade it.
8
 When
this control is well maintained, the military generally believes that it is necessary to keep 
political neutrality by limiting itself to the field of military operations.
9
This objective civilian control is quite opposed to subjective civilian control. 
Huntington stated “subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the 
military, making them the mirror of the state.”
10
 In the context of subjective civilian
control, politicians do not respect the distinctive realm of soldiers. Politicians, therefore, 
want to have direct influence over military operations that are respected as a distinctive 
area of soldiers in objective civilian control situations.
11
 In this situation, since politicians
can control the promotions of soldiers, soldiers cannot but follow the instructions of 
politicians rather than assert their opinions to politicians.
12
 Also, if the soldiers are
subjectively loyal to a particular civilian group that controls them, the political neutrality 
of the soldiers may be destroyed and conflicts may arise among civilian politicians.
13
Huntington’s other main theory of civil-military relations is military 
professionalism. Huntington’s definition of military professionalism is that “professional 
6 Ibid., 83.








soldiers should admit political leadership of civilian leaders while maintaining political 
neutrality without undermining the principle of civilian control, and that the military is 
dedicated to external security only.”
14
2. Civil-Military Relations Theory after Huntington
After Huntington, many scholars explained the types of civil-military relations. At 
first, Eric A. Nordlinger said that the civilian control was divided into the traditional 
model, liberal model and presentation model.
15
 The traditional model is a theory that 
explains the Middle Ages’ feudal European civil-military system. Civilian control is 
possible because of the unity of politicians and soldiers, and the homogeneity of 
worldview.
16
 The liberal model is the theory that the military is responsible for keeping 
the country safe from external threats by moving away from politics itself, and politicians 
should deal with domestic problems and conflicts.
17
 The presentation model explains the 
control of civilization, which is mainly seen in communist and totalitarian countries, and 
it is the theory that politicians use ideology and charge of personnel decisions to gain the 
loyalty of the military.
18
 Nordlinger warned, however, that this presentation model could 
lead to the politicization of the military and make it possible for the military to intervene 
in domestic politics.
19
Morris Janowitz identified civil-military relations centering on the political 
development of developing countries and the political involvement of the military, which 
distinguished the types of civil-military relations into developing country type and 
developed country type models.
20
 First of all, the developed country model is divided into
14 Huntington, 70–72.
15 Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Government (Englewood Cliffs: J.





20 Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in The Developing Nations (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1988) 78–99. 
8 
aristocratic feudal model, democratic model, and totalitarian model.
21
 The aristocratic 
feudal model explains that before industrialism took place in the West, the military elites 
and civil elites had the background of the same social aristocracy.
22
 The democratic 
model makes a difference between the civil and military elites, and the civilian authority 
controls the army well through official institutions and rules.
23
 The totalitarian model is a 
model in which revolutionary elites from civilians who are from popular authoritarian 
political parties control military elites.
24
 In this model, the elites control the army mainly 
by secret police or political organization.
25
 The developing country model is divided into 
authoritarian individual control model, authoritarian popular party control model, 
democratic competition model, civil-military coalition system model, and military 
oligarchy system model. 26  Developing countries mean those nations that are still 
undergoing political development. 27  The authoritarian individual control model is a 
common occurrence in developing countries in the early modernization period, when 
individual dictatorship inhibits the expansion of military forces. 28  The authoritarian 
popular party control model refers to the situation where a single mass party uses civilian 
police and social systems to deter the military.
29
 The democratic competition model 
refers to a state that restricts the functions and powers of the military through formal 
institutions and regulations.
30
 The civil-military coalition system model refers to the state 
in which the military actively supports civilian political parties or private political 
groups.
31













acting as a formal or informal judge.
32
 The military oligarchy system model refers to a
state in which the military appears as the dominant force and restricts or represses the 
political activities of civilians.
33
Stanislav Andreski described the praetorianism model. The praetorianism model 
refers to the country in which the military participates directly in politics, using military 
rebellions or coups, not in accordance with legally recognized constitutional 
procedures.
34
Next, H. D. Lasswell promoted the “the garrison state model.” This model refers 
to a state in which a civilian political elite uses the military as a means to rule the country 
like Imperialist Japan, with fear of war.
35
3. The New Civil-Military Relations Theory
Civil–military relations theory has been developed by many scholars since 
Huntington. The scholars of the new group, however, think that the past civil-military 
relations theory just concentrates on how the civil-military relations should be. 36 
Therefore, they have made the new civil-military relations theory to overcome the 
limitation.37 
Cristiana Matei argued “in order to overcome the challenges of civil-military 
relations in the current world, it is not enough merely to maintain civilian control over the 
military, but also to develop effective military, police and intelligence agencies that 
perform security maintenance functions.”38  
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Stanislav Andreski, “On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships,” Journal of Strategic
Studies 3, no. 3 (1980): 4. 
35 Harold. D. Lasswell, “The Garrison State,” American Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (Jan 1941),
455–468. 
36 Cristiana Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” in The Routledge
Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: 




In other words, the new paradigm emphasizes effectiveness as well as civilian 
control of the military. Their specific claims propose institutional control mechanisms, 
oversight, and the inculcation of professional norms as methods of civilian control.39 The 
scholars who argue the new civil-military relations theory also explain that effectiveness 
is determined by how well prepared security institutions are in their assigned tasks and 
roles, but it is very difficult to measure the extent.40 Specifically, they present three 
essential elements for security agencies to carry out their roles efficiently. First, they 
must have their own future plans such as national security strategies, national military 
strategies, defense white papers, and disaster plans.41 Second, there must be a structure 
and a process for organizing and executing their roles—examples are the ministry of 
national defense, the ministry of the interior, and the NSC.42 Third, the state must have 
resources such as political capital, money, and manpower to purchase equipment and to 
train personnel for assigned tasks.43  
Incentives that enable civilians to pursue civilian control of the military are also 
important factors. 44  Examples include punishing former non-democratic regimes, 
establishing democratic institutions, and threats outside and inside the country. 45  In 
particular, threats are the worst when external threats are low and domestic threats are 
high; when external threats are high and internal threats are low, it is a good situation for 
civilian control.46 
This study will use the new paradigm of civil-military relations research 
suggested by Matei et al. in analyzing civil-military relations during the process of 






44 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Conclusion,” in The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, ed.
Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 2013), 346–348. 
45 Ibid.
46 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 11–19. 
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B. NARCIS SERRA’S MILITARY REFORM THEORY 
This chapter explains civil-military relations theory that can be used appropriately 
to explain the change of civil-military relations in the process of democratization among 
the new civil–military relations theories. 
This study focuses on Serra’s military reform theory (Figure 1) in order to analyze 
the change of civil–military relations in South Korea and Taiwan’s democratization 
process. Originally, Serra’s military reform theory was created to analyze the change of 
democratization of civilian relations in Spain’s democratization process.47 Serra divided 
the democratization process into democratic transition and democratic consolidation, and 
made a visual graph using the three elements of conflict level axis, professionalism axis 
and control of military axis.48 This graph helps to analyze the changes of civil-military 
relations in an arithmetic and visual way regardless of the nationality of civil-military 
relations. Therefore, in this study Serra’s military reform theory will be of great help in 
objectively analyzing the similarities and differences between the changes in civil-
military relations during the process of democratization in South Korea and Taiwan. 
According to Serra, “democratic transition occurs when democratically elected 
civilians end military intervention in the policy making process, the military may 
themselves cease to intervene in, or the military privileges may be removed by civilian 
governments.”49 He also argues “democratic consolidation occurs when elected civilian 
governments can establish and implement military and defense policies, and when the 
government is able to supervise the military whether the policies are properly 
implemented.”50 The tool consists of three dimensions: a conflict level axis, a control of 
military axis, and a professionalism axis.51  
47 Narcís Serra, The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces (Cambridge:






Each of these axes helps the country to analyze visually how civil–military 
relations have been changing during the process of democratization. 
The conflict level axis, which is the vertical axis, is able to analyze high tension 
between civilians and military to low tension between civilians and military.52 One of the 
horizontal axes, the control of military axis, can be analyzed from the military control of 
politics to civilian control of the military. 53  Finally, one of the horizontal axes, the 
professionalism axis, can be analyzed from army as an institution to army as an 
occupation. 54  It is possible to analyze the situation of military reform during the 
democratization transition and consolidation process. 




55 Source: Serra, 64.
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1. The Factors that Affect the Civil-Military Relations during
Democratic Transition
To analyze military reform using the tool presented above, one needs to know the 
factors that affect each axis of analysis. They are factors during democratic transition.  
The factors that influence the conflict level axis, which is the vertical axis, include 
legitimizing democracy, existence of internal conflicts, external influences, coherent 
government actions, and behavior of key political actors.56  
The factors affecting the control of the military axis, which is the horizontal axis, 
are legislation on national defense and a reduction of the military presence in the civilian 
sectors of the administration.57 
The factors influencing the professionalism axis, the second horizontal axis, 
include limiting the number of soldiers involved in politics, implementing human rights 
education in military schools, introducing tolerance for other religions, gradually 
removing the symbols of the former regime, exchanging with other democratic countries, 
and reducing the size of the military.58 
2. Factors that Affect the Civil-Military Relations during Democratic
Consolidation
Next are factors that influence military reform during democratic consolidation. 
The factors that affect the conflict level axis, which is the vertical axis, are 
increasing the power and legitimacy of the civilian government.59 
The factors affecting the control of the military axis, which is the horizontal axis, 
are legal reforms to consolidate democracy, drafting military policy, and eliminating 







The factors that influence the professionalism axis, which is the second horizontal 
axis, are defining new missions and ensuing need for organizational change, measures 
impacting on the forces as a career, and changing the quality of life in the military.  
15 
III. SOUTH KOREA
A. THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS 
Military dictatorships in South Korea since the early 1960s formed a military-
superior type of civil–military relations. These civil-military relations, however, began to 
change with the movement of democratization in South Korea since the late 1970s. This 
chapter shows that the changes of civil-military relations are related to the movement of 
democratization. Therefore, this chapter will first look at the process of democratization 
in South Korea. 
1. The Origin of Democracy and Beginning of the Military Regime
The origin of democracy in South Korea can be found in the Donghak Peasant 
Movement61  and the establishment of the Independent Association 62  in the late 19
th
century. 63  The Donghak peasant movement is a movement in which hundreds of 
thousands of peasants resisted the monarchy in 1886. It insisted on abolition of a class 
system, equality, and human rights. After this movement, Seo Jae-pil and other 
intellectuals who studied Western politics established the Independent Association to 
protect the nation from foreign powers and to reform society in 1896.64 In 1897, the 
Independent Association organized a popular movement called the People’s Mass 
Meeting that promoted major democratic values such as freedom, equality, human rights, 
61 The Donghak Peasant Movement was an anti-feudalism and anti-foreign movement that took place
in 1894 during the Chosun dynasty. Donghak is a religion of the Chosun people; the term Donghak [the 
East religion] means that it is opposed to West’s Christianity. It was founded in 1860 by Choi Jae-woo. The 
core doctrine is “Man is heaven, and all men should not be despised and discriminated, and the heart of 
heaven is the heart of man.” The Donghak Peasant Movement, in which hundreds of thousands of people 
participated, succeeded in overthrowing the Chosun government military, but the Chosun government 
brought the Qing and the Japanese forces over them. Finally, the movement was defeated. 
62 In 1886, it was a civil society organization based on the cultivated intellectuals such as Seo Jae-pil.
Internally, it claimed human rights and suffrage of the people. In particular, it has opened up the People’s 
Mass Meeting to push for the declaration of democratic values such as freedom, equality, human rights, 
national sovereignty, and separation of power. In 1889, however, the Gojong of the Chosun Dynasty, who 
felt threatened by the movement, dissolved the Independent Association. 
63 Hyung-ik Choi, “The Origin of Modern Democracy in Korea,” Korean Studies Quarterly 27, no. 3
(Sep 2004): 183–209. 
64 Ibid.
16 
national sovereignty, and separation of powers.65 A representative example was to form a 
democratic parliament. 66  In addition, the Independent Association operated its own 
newspaper, the Independence Newspaper, that formed a forum for public opinion through 
free speech.67  Although the efforts of the Independent Association failed due to the 
repression of the Chosun dynasty, when the Korean Provisional Government was 
established in 1919 in Shanghai, it took the Democratic Republic as a provisional 
constitution by the influence of the Independent Association.68 Since then, after liberation 
from Japanese imperialism in 1945, South Korea directly imported American democracy 
through the US military.69 At this time, South Korea coordinated the democratic values 
that they already had with American democracy.70 Finally, when the Korean government 
was established in 1947, democracy was adopted as a constitution.71 The April 19th 
Revolution
72
 in 1960 is a representative example of the South Korean democracy. At that
time, the Lee Seung-man (period of presidency: 1948–1960) regime staged illegal 
elections in order to build a dictatorship system. Hundreds of thousands of citizens 
resisted and broke the regime, however.  
After the revolution, there was a Chang Myun (period of presidency: 1960–1961) 
regime in South Korea through a democratic election. The democratic regime did not last 
long, however. In 1961, Major General Park Chung-hee (period of presidency: 1962–
1979), took control of the country by staging a coup. After this, though there had been a 
long military regime in South Korea, South Korean society did not give up and continued 
a democratic movement. South Korea’s democracy, which was rooted in the late Chosun 








72 The April 19
th
 Revolution was a protest by hundreds of thousands of citizens who opposed the
government in April 1960 when the government tried to elect Lee Ki-boong as a vice president by illegal 
means. In the face of this national resistance, President Lee Seung-man finally resigned on April 26. 
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formed a structure in the US military government with American democracy.73 Although 
the democracy was in crisis after the military regime became prolonged, economic 
development through industrialization of capitalism in the 1970s led to the expansion of 
the middle class within the society, forming civil society.74 In addition, the spread of 
complaints within the society brought by authoritarian violence stimulated the democratic 
movement of student forces that had been in power since the April 19
th
 revolution.75 Due
to these factors, the democratization movement in South Korea once again occurred in 
earnest in the late 1970s. 
In particular, the Bu-Ma democratic movement76 occurred in 1979. Since the 
opposition Democratic Party won in the general election held in December 1978, there 
had been a national democratic movement. The Republican Party, which was the ruling 
party, removed Kim Young-sam, who was then the president of the Democratic Party, 
from the congress in October 1979. On October 16, 1979, a massive democratization 
movement started in the Busan and the Masan regions, led by university students. From 
October 18, the Park Chung-hee regime declared martial law in the area and mobilized 
military troops to suppress the demonstrations. Nevertheless, protests continued until 
October 26, when Park Chung-hee died. 
2. Chun Doo-hwan Regime and the Movement of Full-Scale
Democratization
Park Chung-hee, the South Korean dictator, was assassinated by Kim Jae-kyu, 
who was the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, on October 26, 1979. After 
that, people hoped that the Korean society would be democratized, but Major General 
Chun Doo-hwan launched a coup to install the military regime again. In particular, the 
73 Ibid.
74 Chang-jip Choi, Minjuhwa ihu ui Minjujuui [Democracy after democratization] (Seoul:
Humanitasu, 2010), 82–106. 
75 Ibid.
76 The Bu-ma Democratic Uprising was a democratization movement in October 1979 to protest the
dictatorship of the Park Chung-hee regime in the Busan and Masan regions. Tens of thousands of civilians 
participated in the demonstration, where students of Pusan National University started saying “remove the 
Yushin.” The Park Chung-hee regime declared martial law in this area and mobilized troops to suppress the 
movements. Immediately after this incident, Kim Jae-kyu, who was the head of the Central Intelligence 
Agency on October 26, assassinated President Park Chung-hee. 
18 
Chun Doo-hwan regime (period of presidency: 1980–1988) took control of all political 
and economic institutions using the military.
77
 The military took major civilian positions
throughout the country, which was more severe than in the past.
78
 At the time of the
military regime, the military had an overwhelming advantage over civilians. First of all, 
the main members of the administration, including the president, were reserve soldiers. In 
addition, the soldiers made direct political parties and participated in legislative activities. 
The military intelligence agency also had the authority to inspect the civilian population, 
so that the military’s ability to monitor and intervene in the society was strong. Schools 
and universities conducted military exercises, and the military conducted political 
education. In particular, a unique case in South Korea was “the Yushin Secretary System,” 
which hired reservists who were usually captains (O-3) as senior government officials. 
This system not only allowed the retired generals to take over the leadership of the 
administration, but also young officer reservists were able to take over the middle 
organization of the administration. 
Thus, during the Chun Doo-hwan regime, the conflict between the democratic 
movement power and the state power became more severe.
79
 The May 18th incident is a 
representative example. Hundreds of thousands of Gwangju citizens protested against the 
regime of Chun Doo-hwan and the abolition of martial law. Against this backdrop, the 
Chun Doo-hwan regime put airborne troops in Gwangju and suppressed the protesters by 
force. In the process, 633 people were killed.
80
 This incident resulted in a critical wound 
in civil-military relations. Despite this incident, however, citizens continued to struggle 
for democracy. The crucial event that led to the democratization of South Korea in 
particular was the democratization uprising in June 1987. Citizens at that time demanded 
a general election, which citizens hoped to elect the president directly to end the 
dictatorship. President Chun Doo-hwan made “the April 13th Constitutional 
77 Younggap Cho, Min’gun Kwan’gye wa Kukka Anbo [Civil Military Relations and National
Security] (Seoul: Bookorea, 2005), 284. 
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., 285.
80 Minjuhwa Undong Kinyŏm Saŏphoe [the Democratization Movement Memorial Business
Association], The Development of Korean Democracy 3 (Seoul: Dolbegae, 2010), 137. 
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Arrangement,” however, under which his successors would be elected indirectly by 
electoral colleges. Then, while people made major democratic protests, there were Park 
Jong-cheol’s death by torture and Lee Han-yul’s death by tear gas attack.81 The two 
events exploded the anger of the citizens. Citizens across the country came to the streets 
and protested against dictatorship. Millions of people participated in the protest, which 
lasted for about three weeks. Finally, the Chun Doo-hwan regime announced a 
constitutional amendment on June 29, 1987, and promised “presidential direct election.” 
This ended the demonstration.  
In the presidential election held at the end of the year, however, Roh Tae-woo 
(period of presidency: 1988–1993), who was a military junior member of President Chun 
Doo-hwan, was elected president. The reason was that democratic activists Kim Dae-jung 
and Kim Young-sam failed to unify and run independently.  
Nevertheless, in the Roh Tae-woo regime, civil-military relations showed change 
because he had to consider that more than half of the people voted for democracy 
activists in the presidential election.82 First of all, the ministry of national defense issued 
a commander letter to the whole military on January 1, 1990, emphasizing “the political 
neutrality of the military and adhering to its mission.”
83
 Furthermore, Lee Jong-koo, the 
minister of defense in 1991, said, “the political intervention of the military is an 
anachronistic idea, and I do not think that officers will intervene in politics. It would be 
81 On January 3, 1987, the police arrested Park Jong-chul, who was a student of Seoul National
University, to investigate the democratic movement. Police said on January 14 that Park Jong-cheol died 
after he drank cold water and was surprised by the sound of hitting the desk. The media reported the 
possibility of death by torture based on statement of autopsy, however. Though the prosecution began 
investigating the case, the police officially announced that the only two policemen mistakenly murdered 
Park Jong-cheol by a water torture. The police cremated the body, thus destroying the evidence. On August 
15, 1987, however, “Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice” exposed the organizational reduction of the 
police’s Park Jong-cheol case, and systematic torture by major police officers. After the death of Park Jong-
cheol, the democratic movement against the Chun Doo-hwan regime accelerated. In the meantime, on June 
9, 1987, a student of Yonsei University, Lee Han-yeol, was killed by police tear gas attack during the 
protest. The scene that he was slaughtered was reported to domestic and foreign media. The two events 
further fueled national resistance to the Chun Doo-hwan regime and became the fuse of the June 
democratic movement. 
82 In the 13th presidential election in South Korea, President Roh Tae-woo, who succeeded Chun Doo-
hwan, won 36.3 percent. Kim Young-sam, who is a democratization activist, won 28 percent and Kim Dae-
jung who is also a democratization activist, received 27 percent. 
83 Cho, 287.
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disastrous to intervene in politics.”
84
 At that time, the military did not actively try to 
intervene in politics. According to Aurel Croissant, soldiers did not think that they would 
be threatened by the government because Roh Tae-woo was from the military and 
supported by the Chun Doo-hwan regime.
85
 For example, investigations of the military 
about illegal events in the past had been delayed through political agreements between 
the president and the opposition political parties.
86
 Also, military intelligence agencies 
continued to monitor civilians as before.
87
 Therefore, the soldiers did not fear Roh Tae-
woo’s regime or feel the need to intervene politically.
88
 President Roh Tae-woo tried to 
protect the interests, values and political status of the military.
89
  
Even if military professionalism at that time was stable, there were cases in which 
the political neutrality of the military could be suspected. One example was the illegal 
election activity of the military in the March 24th general election in 1992.
90
 The 
commanders of the military advocated or criticized specific political parties and 
candidates.
91
 At that time, the change of military professionalism did not bring civilian 
control. Specifically, the defense minister had been a retired general, and institutional 
efforts for civil control did not take place. The military thus maintained their authority 
under the protection of the regime. 
3. The Kim Young-sam Regime and the Beginning of the Civilian 
Regime 
In 1993, President Kim Young-sam (period of presidency: 1993–1998) was 
elected as the first genuine civilian president after the long-term dictatorship of the 
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military. From that time, a civilian democratic government was reborn in South Korea. 
He joined forces with past military regimes to be elected president, however. Kim 
Young-sam was a member of the Democratic Liberal Party composed of the Democratic 
Justice Party, the Unification Democratic Party, and the New Democratic Republican 
Party. Nevertheless, after the election of President Kim Young-sam, the political 
environment was favorable for reforming the military. 92  First of all, he won the 
presidential election in 1992, through the direct election of the people. Furthermore, he 
was a member of the conservative Democratic Liberal Party, so he was not suspected of 
being a pro-North Korean.
93
 These conditions made the militarily easily accept him. 
Furthermore, he was originally a democratic activist, so he also had legitimacy as a 
democratic politician. 94 In this friendly environment, President Kim Young-sam 
conducted reforms to correct civil-military relations.95
His most important achievement was removing the “Hanahoe [One group].” This 
group only selected officers from the Army Academy, and its members were born in 
Taegu and Gyeongsang provinces.
96
 They were powerful forces in the army with the
sponsorship of President Park Chung-hee and President Chun Doo-hwan.
97
 President
Kim Young-sam excluded members of Hanahoe, including the chief of the army, the 
commander of the security intelligence, and the commander of special forces who had 
real power in the army.
98
 Next, the Kim Young-sam regime investigated the corruption of
the military that had not been revealed in the past.
99
 President Kim Young-sam’s actions
against the military did not end with this. He even arrested former President Chun Doo-
hwan and Roh Tae-woo and thirteen former generals who had staged a coup as soldiers in 










when the military killed civilians.
100
 He also abolished the military intelligence agency’s 




In this process, the military did not resist the regime. A possible reason is fear of 
the citizens. Soldiers experienced direct armed conflict with citizens, undergoing the May 
18th democratic movement of armed conflicts in the previous regime. In addition, the 
military witnessed the democratic uprising when tens of millions of citizens came out on 
the streets to resist military dictatorships in June 1987.102 The military had to worry that 
their political intervention would lead to a democratic struggle of citizens. Therefore, 
there was no willingness for the military to suffer the many casualties that could arise 
when the military suppressed the struggle of such citizens. This opinion of the military 
was also revealed in the interview by Lee Jong-koo, the former Minister of National 
Defense. Lee Jong-koo warned that military intervention would bring about disaster.103 
Furthermore, the democratization movement continued during the Roh Tae-woo regime. 
This made it difficult for the military to conduct political engagement. The Roh Tae-woo 
regime responded strongly to the democratization movements in various parts of 
society.104 On April 26, 1991, when Kang Kyung-dae, a student of Myongji University, 
was murdered by the plainclothes police during the demonstration, nationwide 
demonstrations for democracy again took place. 105  While several million citizens 
participated in demonstrations nationwide for sixty days,106 eleven people committed 
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suicide, and another student died during the demonstration. 107  These nationwide 
democratization movements played a role of checking the power of the military. 
Such efforts by President Kim Young-sam certainly contributed to military 
professionalism. Civilian control of the military was only partially improved, however. 
First, no civilian defense minister was appointed. Only a few civilians served as deputy 
defense ministers.
108
 Furthermore, most of the employees in the ministry of national 
defense were active military officers.
109
 The military control in the congress changed 
considerably, however.
110
 The national defense commission in the congress began to 
properly check and balance against the ministry of defense.
111
  
Cho Young-gap assessed Kim Young-sam’s military reform as follows: “First, it 
contributed to increasing military professionalism; second, the dismantling of private 
groups in the military and the reform of the personnel; third, the restructuring of the 
security command, which was the most political institution in the military; finally, he 
contributed to make democratic and effective military operations.”112 According to a 
survey113 on the national consciousness conducted in Korea, the military had the largest 
influence on politics in 1988, but in 1990 it ranked fourth, and in 1993 it fell to sixth.114 
Also, the number of members of congress from military services decreased significantly. 
In 1992, the national congress members from the military service were thirty-five 
percent, but they were reduced to fifteen percent in 1996.115 Also, the proportion of 
former military officers among the higher governmental officers (ministers) had declined 
                                                 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ki-joo Kim, “The Soldier and the State in South Korea,” Journal of International and Area Studies 
21, no. 2 (2014): 125. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid., 127. 
112 Cho, 298–301. 
113 Seoul National University, Hankook Sahoe wa Kookmin eusik Josa Yungu [Korean Society and 
National Consciousness Survey and Research], 1993. 
114 Cho, 295. 
115 Ibid., 297. 
24 
from nineteen percent to eight percent.
116
 People had active support for Kim Young-
sam’s military reform. At that time, ninety percent of the people supported the reform, 
and only three percent of the people worried about the side effects of the reform.117 
4. Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun Regime and the First Regime Change
After President Kim Young-sam, President Kim Dae-jung (period of presidency: 
1998–2003) took power. President Kim Dae-jung’s leadership was a major test of civil-
military relations.
118
 Although President Kim Young-sam was a civilian, he inherited the 
political party from the past military regime. The political party to which Kim Dae-Jung 
belonged had never been in power in the past, however, and had struggled historically 
with the military regime. Indeed, President Kim Dae-jung was kidnapped and almost 
assassinated by the military government.119 Therefore, President Kim Dae-jung’s election 
and power could be a major stimulus for the military forces. Moreover, President Kim 
Dae-jung had a sunshine policy for North Korea. The sunshine policy emphasized 
dialogue and cooperation between the two Koreas. This was a policy that was resented by 
the military, which mainly had a view of opposing North Korea. Nevertheless, the 
military accepted the policy of President Kim Dae-jung.
120
 The military officially did not 
protest against the regime or intervene in domestic politics.
121
 This kind of civil-military 
relationship showed that the professionalism of the military in South Korea has been 
116 Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, Philip Lorenz, and Paul W. Chambers, Democratization and
Civilian Control in Asia (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 61. 
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118 Ibid., 376.
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Tokyo in order to organize a group branch for the democratization movement for South Korea. On August 
8, 1973, when Kim Dae-jung was staying at a hotel in Tokyo, he was attacked by members of the Korean 
Central Intelligence Agency and was forced into a ship in Osaka. At that time, Kim Dae-jung was in danger 
of being drowned at sea with a weight. But, since the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force discovered the 
ship, the kidnappers abandoned the assassination. After a few days, Kim Dae-jung was found near his home 
in Seoul. (This anecdote was revealed in Kim Dae-jung ‘s autobiography [Kim Dae-jung, Autobiography of 
Kim Dae-jung (Seoul: Samin, 2011).], the records of investigation by the Japanese government, and the 
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stabilized. In addition, he appointed a number of civilian experts to the ministry of 
defense and created the National Security Council to control defense policy.
122
Following Kim Dae-jung, President Roh Moo-hyun (period of presidency: 2003–
2008), who came from the same political party, continued engagement with North Korea, 
but a stable civil-military relationship was relatively well maintained. He further expanded 
the powers of the NSC and tried to monitor the military’s weapons adoption program by 
creating the Defense Acquisition Program Administration.
123
 He also created a 
congressional hearing of the joint chiefs of staff to strengthen the military control by the 
national assembly.
124
It is not that there was no noise in civil-military relations, however. In 2002, when 
the Kim Dae-jung regime pursued the sunshine policy,125 North Korean naval vessels 
invaded to the south in the Western Sea, resulting in “the Second Yeonpyeong Sea 
Battle.” At that time, six South Korean navy personnel were killed and eighteen injured. 
After the battle, the president, the prime minister, and the minister of national defense did 
not attend the funeral ceremony of the dead on the grounds of the ceremony rules.
126
 
There was considerable dissatisfaction within the military.
127
 Nevertheless, the military 
did not officially oppose the regime. There was a similar case in the Roh Moo-hyun 
government. Lee Jong-seok, who was chief of the NSC in 2004, instructed the military not 
to say “Main Enemy” when talking about North Korea.
128
 This was a political decision 




125 It is the Kim Dae-jung regime’s reconciliation and cooperation policy toward North Korea. The
aim was to create the environment and conditions for North Korea to change itself through more contact, 
dialogue and cooperation. One of the ways is building an economic community from the perspective of 
common prosperity of the whole nation. [Source: “North Korea Information Portal,” Ministry of 
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progressed between the two Koreas, but there was considerable internal dissatisfaction 
from the military.
129
 According to a survey conducted by the ministry of defense at the
time, eighty-four percent of the soldiers said they should use the term “Main Enemy” for 
North Korea.
130
 One officer said in an interview, “It has become difficult to give our
soldiers psychological training, and it will get tougher in the future.”
131
 Nevertheless,
however, the military did not stage an official rebellion against the regime. Therefore, 
after Kim Young-sang and Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun’s regime, it can be said 
that the professionalism of the South Korea military stabilized considerably. 
At this stage, possible reasons why the military accepted the changes in civil-
military relations would be not only the fear of the resistance of the citizens but also the 
maturation of the perception of the military’s own democratization. South Korea’s 
military service system is a conscription system, and all adult males who are physically 
able are required to do military service. Therefore, the majority of the members of the 
military are ordinary citizens, not professional soldiers. This means that, even if the 
military commanders plan an engagement in politics as they had in the past, they should 
doubt whether the members would join in any attempt. The maturation of democracy 
within these forces naturally led to the improvement of military professionalism. 
Civilian control was possible because the civilian president acts as the top leader 
of the military. After the regime of Kim Young-sam, however, there has not been a 
genuine civilian minister of national defense, the official who makes actual military 
policy. All of them were retired generals. To its credit, the regime tried to raise the ratio 
of civilian employees in the ministry of national defense to increase the proportion of 
civilians from fifty percent to seventy percent in the long term.
132
 Nonetheless, the main
positions that determine policies were occupied by active soldiers and prior-military 
civilians.
133







the armed forces to justify and retain its institutional autonomy in the process of 
democratic consolidation.”
134
B. CHANGES IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
Using Narcis Serra’s theoretical analysis framework and the historical 
background introduced in the preceding chapter, this chapter examines the changing 
civil-military relations of South Korea during democratization. 
Serra argues that “The democratic transition occurs when democratically elected 
civilians end military intervention in the policy making process, because the military may 
themselves cease to intervene in, or the military privileges may be removed by civilian 
governments.”135 “Democratic consolidation occurs when elected civilian governments 
can establish and implement military and defense policies, and when the government is 
able to supervise the military whether the policies are properly implemented.”136 
According to this, the democratic transition in South Korea can be categorized as 
occurring during the Kim Young-sam regime. This is because the Kim Young-sam 
regime abolished the military intelligence monitoring function to civilian sectors137 and 
eliminated the internal private group of the army that had a significant impact on defense 
policy.138 In addition, President Kim Young-sam had significantly reduced the rate of 
advancement of government officials from the military during the regime. 139  These 
factors helped to prevent the military from interfering with the government’s decision-
making process. 
The democratic consolidation can be categorized as taking place during the Kim 
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appointed a number of civilian experts in the ministry of national defense, and the NSC 
had been created directly under the President to create and control defense policies by the 
civilian government.140 President Kim Dae-jung’s successor, President Roh Moo-hyun, 
expanded the NSC’s capabilities141 and increased the civilian staff in the ministry of 
national defense.142 He also created the defense acquisition program administration for 
government surveillance of the military’s arms purchase business.143 Therefore, the Kim 
Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun regimes can be categorized as the administrations of the 
democratic consolidation period. First, let us look at the process of the democratic 
transition. 
1. Democratic Transition Period—Kim Young-sam Regime 
First, the conflict level axis, which is the vertical axis of Serra’s model, can be 
considered stable. After the long military dictatorship, President Kim Young-sam was 
elected as the first genuine civilian president through popular direct election. It can be 
judged that the legitimacy of democracy greatly increased as he took power in a legal 
process. Furthermore, President Kim Young-sam succeeded in eliminating Hanahoe, a 
powerful military faction.
144
 He also arrested former presidents and generals who had 
caused a coup and massacred civilians in the past.
145
 Even in this situation, however, the 
military did not protest or resist the government, and accepted the reform measures.
146
 In 
this regard, the conflict level axis did not increase significantly, and remained stable. 
Next, look at the control of the military axis. At first, Kim Young-sam abolished 
the military intelligence agency’s civilian surveillance.
147
 In contrast, the military 
surveillance function of the national assembly was improved during the Kim Young-sam 
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 The national defense commission, in particular, has been functioning in
the national assembly, allowing for checks and surveillance of the military.
149
Furthermore, the proportion of former military officers among the higher governmental 
officers (ministers) had declined from nineteen percent to eight percent.
150
 These factors
indicate that the control of the military axis moved significantly towards civil control of 
the military. 
Finally, on another horizontal axis, the professionalism axis, the number of 
military members of the national assembly dropped from thirty-five percent to fifteen 
percent during the regime.
151
 Also, the government abolished the military intelligence
agency’s civilian surveillance and made them just focus on their original military security 
job.
152
 Furthermore, according to the survey153 on national consciousness conducted in
South Korea, the military had the largest influence on politics in 1988, but in 1990 it 
ranked fourth, and in 1993, it fell to sixth.
154
 These figures indicate that the
professionalism axis has moved significantly towards the military as an occupation. 
2. Democratic Consolidation Period—Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun
Regimes
Next, let us look at the period of democratic consolidation. This period can be 
seen as the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations. First, let us deal with the 
conflict level axis, which is a vertical axis. The inauguration of President Kim Dae-jung 
was a major watershed for civil-military relations.155 During the term of President Kim 
Dae-jung and his successor, Roh Moo-hyun, however, there was no official military 
protest or rebellion. The military embraced and implemented the policies of civilian 
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leaders such as the Sunshine Policy (an engagement policy with North Korea).
156
 This
indicates that the vertical axis had stabilized considerably and had shifted towards a low 
tension between civilians and the military. 
At the control axis of the military, Kim Dae-jung appointed a number of civilian 
experts to the ministry of defense and created the NSC to control defense policies.
157
Following Kim Dae-jung, President Roh Moo-hyun, who came from the same political 
party, further expanded the powers of the NSC and tried to monitor the military’s 
weapons adoption program by creating the defense acquisition program administration.
158
He also created a congressional hearing system of the joint chiefs of staff.
159
 In addition,
Roh Moo-hyun’s regime tried to raise the ratio of civilian employees in the ministry of 
national defense to increase the proportion of civilians from fifty percent to seventy 
percent in the long term.
160
 As a result, the control axis of the military moved
significantly towards the civilian control of the military. 
The last remaining horizontal axis is the professionalism axis. The ratio of reserve 
military officers to the cabinet was reduced during the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo-hyun 
regimes, especially during the Roh regime as it was mainly limited to the minister of 
defense.
161
 Furthermore, efforts were made to raise the salary of the military personnel 
and build welfare facilities for soldiers and their families.
162
 Also, a defense reform was 
promoted to reduce the size of and reorganize the military, reorienting it from a 
conventional war to an effect-oriented focus. 163  These factors have allowed the 
professionalism axis to move significantly toward the army as an occupation. Figure 2 
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Figure 2.  Changes in civil-military relations during democratization in South 
Korea.164 
C. MAJOR IMPLICATIONS 
As a result, the civil–military relations of South Korea gradually changed. When 
Roh Tae-woo was elected directly after the long military dictatorship, he did not directly 
implement reforms because he was from the military. There were limited changes, 
however. The democratic transition of civil-military relations in South Korea seems 
likely with the election of President Kim Young-sam. He contributed to the civilian 
control of the military and to the improvement of professionalism by accomplishing the 
elimination of Hanahoe and the defeat of the past coup forces. Furthermore, President 
Kim Dae-jung and President Roh Moo-hyun, who succeeded Kim Dae-jung, strengthened 
the civilian control of the military by creating the NSC and expanding the ratio of civilian 
staff in the ministry of defense.165  
164 Adapted from Serra, 64.
165 Kuehn, 16 and Kim, 126.
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The application of Serra’s theory of military reform shows that the conflict level 
axis remains fairly stable during the democratic transition and consolidation process, and 
the control of the military axis also moves gradually toward the strengthening of the 
civilian control of the military. The professionalism axis moves toward the army as an 
occupation over time. 
This is related to the democratization movement in South Korean society. In 
South Korea, tens of millions of citizens fought for democratization, beginning with the 
19th April Movement in 1960 and Bu-Ma Democratic Protests in 1979, the May 18th 
Incident in Gwangju in 1980, and the democratization uprising in June 1987. In the 
process, hundreds of civilians were imprisoned, tortured and killed by the authoritarian 
regimes. South Korea became aware of the importance of democratization, however. 
Eventually, this helped the military accept civilian control. 
This movement is also accompanied by military effectiveness and incentives for 
civilians that the new civil-military relations theory emphasizes. Specifically, President 
Roh Moo-hyun created a plan for a defense reform to create a new military paradigm for 
the effectiveness of the military. It tried to make an effective plan against North Korea 
and for dealing with potential external threats in the Northeast Asia region. Also, in terms 
of incentives, President Kim Young-sam was the first genuine civilian president since the 
long military dictatorship. In addition, he was a combative democratic activist during the 
military regimes. Therefore, he determined to fix the civilian control of the military, 
which was not properly established during the military dictatorship, and to punish the 
faults of past regimes. Also, once North Korea began serious nuclear development in the 
1990s, the external threat increased while the internal threat remained stable. Therefore, 
the time was right for him to change civil-military relations with an incentive. 
There are also other sides, however. First, there has not been a genuine civilian 
minister of national defense in South Korea. Moreover, most of them were from the 
army. Members of the navy and air force were rarely appointed. In addition, the degree of 
civilianization of the ministry of national defense is not high, though Kim Dae-jung’s and 
Roh Moo-hyun’s regimes tried to raise the ratio of civilian employees in the ministry of 
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national defense from fifty percent to seventy percent over the long term.
166
 This is 
because the main positions that determine policies were occupied by active soldiers and 
civilians who had been soldiers.
167
 “The ongoing high national security threat would help 
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A. THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS 
This chapter looks at the changes in Taiwan’s civil-military relations. Similar in 
method to the analysis of South Korea, this chapter also reveals that the democratization 
movement in Taiwan correlates with changes in civil-military relations. In Taiwan, 
martial law had continued from Chiang Kai-shek’s 1949 arrival in Taiwan to 1987. In the 
process of democratization in Taiwan, citizens’ voluntary resistance to anti-authoritarian 
as well as other factors such as international pressure and political leaders’ preference 
played an important role.  
1. Chiang Kai-shek and the Beginning of the Long Koumintang Regime
In 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek (period of presidency: 1947–1975) arrived in 
Taiwan after losing the civil war on the Chinese mainland, he declared martial law for the 
whole country of Taiwan and created the powerful dictatorship of the Koumintang. Even 




 took place. The Kuomintang army slaughtered Taiwanese who opposed the
oppressive rule of the Koumintang by force. In Taiwan, a coercive regime maintained 
power until the end of martial law in June 1987. Until that time, the military was a great 
supporter of the dictatorship of the Chiang Kai-shek regime.  
Chiang Kai-shek believed that if troops were mentally armed with political 
education, they would someday be able to reestablish control over the mainland.
170
 The
officers of the Taiwanese military had to become members of the Koumintang.
171
 The
Taiwanese military was not the national army, but the party’s army. During this period, 
169 This is a struggle caused by the Taiwanese inhabitants against the tyranny of the Chinese
Koumintang government officials. At that time, the Kuomintang government slaughtered about thirty 
thousand Taiwanese by sending the military forces from the Chinese mainland. [Republic of China 
Executive Yuan, Feb 28th Incident Research Report, 1991.] 
170 Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan’s Security (New York: Routledge, 2006), 136.
171 Ibid., 137.
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there was no genuine civilian military control in Taiwan.
172
 Although the Koumintang
sent political commissars to the military, the military actively participated in the social 
and political spheres of Taiwan.
173
 First, the soldiers directly participated in the civilian
government.
174
 For example, a deputy of Chiang Kai-shek, General Chen Cheng, led the
administration of Taiwan as a vice president and Prime Minister from 1949 to 1963.
175
Active officers and reserve generals accounted for thirty percent of the members of the 
central standing committee, the most important committee of the Koumintang.
176
 In
addition, the chief of the general staff had the right to report directly to the President 
without going through the prime minister.
177
 Also, the military was able to determine its
own defense policy within the Koumintang.
178
 In the social area, the military established
military training institutions in schools and universities to give political lectures.
179
 The
military also established newspapers, radio stations and film studios to direct the 
Koumintang’s instructions to the public.
180
 In conclusion, the military acted as a guardian
of the Koumintang and exerted a powerful influence on the domestic politics, economy 
and society.
181
 The implementation of martial law had widened the range of activities of
the military and served as a limit to civilian control. 
172 M. Taylor Fravel, “Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan’s
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2. Chiang Ching-kuo and the Beginning of Change for Democracy
The Kaohsiung Incident182  is a meaningful movement that took place during 
Taiwan’s democratization process. It was a demonstration that occurred on December 10, 
1979. The protest was organized by the magazine Meilidao in Kaohsiung City, Taiwan. 
Hundreds of people took part in the demonstration; more than one hundred people were 
arrested by the police and dozens were convicted. This incident had a significant 
influence on Taiwan’s democratization movement. The influence of this incident led to 
the creation of the Democratic Progressive Party, the first opposition party in Taiwan, 
and Chen Shui-bian, a then lawyer in this case, to be elected as president later. This 
incident caused the United States to have an interest in Taiwan’s human rights and 
democracy, causing the U.S. government to put pressure on the Taiwanese 
government.
183
In 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo (period of presidency: 1978–1988), the son of 
Taiwanese leader Chiang Kai-shek, decided to accept democracy in 1986. His decision 
seemed to be made alone, rather than by discussion with ruling leaders.184 In fact, the 
Koumintang’s main officials were not aware of that until he made the decision.185 In an 
interview with the Washington Post in October 1986, he said he planned to abolish 
martial law.
186
 There is no exact record of why he made the decision to accept
democracy. 187  Scholars supposed some possible reasons why he decided to accept 
democracy himself, however. In the first place, there was a rising of social desire for 
182 The Kaohsiung Incident was a democratization movement in Kaohsiung, Taiwan on December 10,
1979. Formosa Magazine, headed by Huang Shin-Chieh, a former congress member, planned the 
democratization movement at the UN Human Rights Day. Hundreds of people participated in the protest 
and demanded the democratization of Taiwan. In the process, more than 100 people were arrested by the 
police and a dozen were handed over for trial. It is a monumental event in Taiwan’s democratization 
movement. 
183 Yi-suo Tzeng, “Civil-Military Relations in Democratizing Taiwan 1986–2007,” (PhD diss.,
George Washington University, 2009), 88. 
184 Hung-mao Tien, “Social Change and Political Development in Taiwan,” in Taiwan in a Time of





democracy after the Kaohsiung Incident in society.
188
 In fact, in Taiwan, the strict 
authoritarianism of the Koumintang made it hard for the democratization movement to 
spread. The Koumintang limited democratic rights guaranteed by the Constitution after 
the 1949 declaration of martial law. In particular, they banned any form of rallies and 
demonstrations and oppressed the democratic movement. 189  The Koumintang killed 
about 3,000 political prisoners during the martial law period.190 Therefore, it was not 
easy for the democratic activists in Taiwan to carry out a broad democratic movement as 
in South Korea.191 Fulda argued that considering the political environment in Taiwan, 
promoting democracy moderately and peacefully was the best possible choice for 
democratic activists.192 He further argued that while the moderate political activists such 
as Lin Xiantang and Kang Ningxiang during the dictatorship of the Koumintang had been 
ignored by academics in the past, their campaigns clearly meant democracy in Taiwan.193 
The movement of change showed, however, as the ruling coalition of the Koumintang 
was loosened during the administration of Chiang Ching-kuo. 194  In addition, in the 
1980s, the rapid economic growth of Taiwan led to a rapid rise in the middle class. As a 
result, the demand for democracy was increasing, and it could have affected to Chiang’s 
decision. 195  The second possible reason is international pressure. As the economic 
growth of the People’s Republic of China made Taiwan internationally isolated, even the 
United States suggested human rights issues in Taiwan. 196  This might have forced 
Chiang to utilize democracy as a diplomatic solution.
197
 The third reason is the personal 
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preference of the need to end the dictatorship of Chiang Ching-kuo. Chong-pin Lin and 
Man-Jung Mignon Chan evaluated, “In the process of distributing the power of a country, 
it is hard to find any example where such a particular leader played a disproportionately 
important role in the world.”198 According to them, Chiang could have made the decision 
to the displeasure of his father’s generation.199 In addition, Chiang studied Socialism and 
Troikaism in his childhood in the Soviet Union. In fact, he had blamed his father as a 
traitor when his father destroyed the joint venture and attacked the Communist Party.200 
Also, Chiang Ching-kuo lost his beloved lover to the Koumintang.201 Therefore, although 
he occupied the seat of the authoritarian leader after his father’s death, he might have 
decided to discontinue authoritarianism himself. 
Chiang Ching-kuo, finally, signed the abolishment of martial law on July 14, 
1987, and officially announced it on the following day. The removal of the martial law of 
Chiang Ching-kuo also had a great impact on civil-military relations. First of all, military 
missions on politics and society were withdrawn.
202
 As a specific example, civilian 
suspects no longer have to be tried in military courts.
203
 In addition, oversight of various 
publications and media has been transferred to the private sector.
204
 In this process, 
however, the influence of the military on politics and society was not removed all at 
once.
205
 In particular, there was the possibility of military rebellion and coup.
206
 In fact, 
Chiang Ching-kuo ordered the military to be ready to deal with emergencies caused by 
the abolition of martial law.
207
 It is suspected as an attempt by Chiang Ching-kuo to
198 Lin and Chan, ibid.
199 Ibid.
200 “Abeoji Jangjeseuwa Teul-eojin Jangjing-gwo Geuneun Naui Jeog-ida” [Chang Ching-kuo, Who
Is Different from His Father Chiang Kai-shek, He s My Enemy], Joongangilbo, Oct 9, 2010. 










 The military did not try to rebel against Chiang Ching-kuo
or attempt to restore martial law using force, however.
209
 As Chiang Ching-kuo died of
health problems and his power was transferred, however, the anxiety grew again.
210
3. Lee Teng-hui and the Efforts for Democracy
When Chiang Ching-kuo died, Lee Teng-hui (period of presidency: 1988–2000), 
then Prime Minister, became president. Lee Teng-hui was born in Taiwan and served as a 
Japanese soldier in imperialist Japan. He was an economist who studied in Japan and the 
United States. He joined the Koumintang in 1971 and later became a prime minister after 
being a minister of agriculture and mayor of Taipei. Though he had been the prime 
minister during the Chiang Ching-kuo regime, he was a native Taiwanese. This could 
have been a limiting factor in the voluntary submission of the military, given that the 
commanders of the military were mostly from the Chinese mainland.
211
His regime settled down democracy more than Chiang Ching-kuo. In 1990, in 
Taipei, the Wild Lily student movement212 was happening, centered on college students. 
At that time, Lee Teng-hui was elected as a president through an indirect election in the 
parliament, and was scheduled to start his term on March 21, 1990. The students 
protested that the people should elect the president directly. Lee Teng-hui met the 
protesters on the first day of his tenure by inviting them to his building. At this time, Lee 
Teng-hui promised to commit to democracy. Lee Teng-Hui soon began reforms to 
transform Taiwan into a true democracy. Lee Teng-hui enacted “Additional Articles of 





212 The Wild Lily student movement was a Taiwanese democratization movement in Taipei from
March 16 to March 22, 1990. In a demonstration in line with the inauguration of Lee Teng-hui, who was 
elected by parliamentary indirect elections, students insisted that the people should elect presidents and 
lawmakers directly by election. The demonstration was boosted by the citizens and the number of 
participants increased to 22,000 according to Linda Chao & Ramon H. Myers, 1998. Lee Teng-hui invited 
protesters to the residence on March 21, the first day of his inauguration, and promised them the transition 
to democracy. 
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in 1991, and people elected the head of the local governors in 1994. Furthermore, in 
1996, Taiwanese citizens directly elected president for the first time. In the 1996 election, 
Lee Teng-hui won a majority of the votes.  
Though Lee Teng-hui was from the Koumintang, conservative military 
commanders did not see him as friendly because of his democratic reforms. At that time, 
Hau Pei-tsun, former chief of the general staff, was a prime minister. He publicly 
opposed Lee Teng-hui’s policies.
213
 In 1991, Lee Teng-hui ordered Gen Chiang Zonglin 
to be promoted as a first-grade general, but Hau Pei-tsun refused to follow him for one 
year.
214
 Furthermore, in June 1991, it became clear that Hau had met with military 
leaders in November 1990 for a secret meeting.
215
 This has led to suspicions that Hau was 
not only suspected of violating the President’s military command, but also of simulating a 
coup.
216
 Furthermore, in October 1992, Hau indirectly criticized and threatened Lee 
Teng-hui’s policy, arguing that soldiers should oppose Taiwan’s independence decision 
that could be made by president, saying “It is unthinkable that the commander of the 
armed forces of the ROC would take no action when seeing the name of the ROC being 
dropped.”
217
 Another problem was political intervention during the 1996 election. 
According to Tzeng’s research, security officials maximized the Missile Crisis
218
 against 
China for the election of Lee Teng-hui.
219
  
In spite of these big and small problems, however, there also had been positive 
changes in the realm of professionalism. First, the Taiwanese military did not try to make 
a direct political engagement. Tang Fei, who was then chief of the general staff in 1998, 
declared in the national assembly that “even if the state changes from ROC to Taiwan, 
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the military will comply with the constitution.”
220
 Chiang Chung-ling, then a defense
minister, repeatedly said the military would maintain loyalty and political neutrality to 
the president.
221
 In addition, since 1993, active officers have not joined the
Koumintang.
222
 In October 1993, a new law prohibited certain political parties from
operating in the military.
223
 In addition, the active officers have ceased to participate in
civilian government.
224
 The military still actively engaged in the security area,
however.
225
 Active officers occupied the upper level of the ministry of national defense
and participated in the national security council and the national security bureau.
226
 Also,
reserve officers were actively involved in making defense policies.
227
Civilian control of the military situation was more difficult. The prime minister, 
who was a reserve military officer, interfered with the president’s military control. 
Though, in Taiwan, the first civilian defense minister was appointed in 1990, he could 
not function properly because of the tremendous resistances of military commanders.
228
Also, military-related policies were made by active officers themselves or reservists. 
Taiwan experienced the Kaohsiung Incident and the Wild Lily student movement, 
but no democratic struggle has taken place by the majority of the population nationwide. 
Therefore, it seems that the perception of the need for democratization of society has not 
spread evenly. Therefore, some military members did not favorably see the changes in 
civil-military relations and think that changes in civil-military relations were inevitably 
required now. Furthermore, though the military did not actively accept democratic 
changes in civil-military relations, they did not need to worry about the possibility of 











4. Chen Shui-bian and the First Regime Change
In the 2000 presidential election, Chen Shui-bian (period of presidency: 2000–
2008) was elected as president. His election was a monumental event in the history of 
democracy in Taiwan. Although Lee Teng-hui is an indigenous Taiwanese, he came from 
the Koumintang. Chen Shui-bian, however, was a human rights lawyer who defended the 
suspects in the Kaohsiung case and later joined the Democratic Progressive Party. In 
addition, he officially supported Taiwanization.
229
 This policy was expected to be in
conflict with the military, which had a deep relationship with the Koumintang. In this 
situation, Lee Teng-hui’s efforts helped to secure stable control for Chen Shui-bian.
230
Just before Chen Shui-bian’s inauguration, Lee Teng-hui gave instructions to 
General Tang Yaomin, a chief of general staff.231  Tang gave a video to the whole 
military saying that the military would be loyal to the new government.
232
 Also, Lee
Teng-hui asked Tang Fei, who served as a minister of defense in his regime, to serve as a 
prime minister in the Chen Shui-bian government.
233
 These measures may have played a
significant role in the military’s stable early relationship with the regime of Chen Shui-
bian.
234
This positive relationship did not last long, however. Chen Shui-bian’s regime 
had difficulty controlling the security institutions.
235
 Some aides of Chen said “In fact,
fifteen percent of those working at security institutions are not loyal to Chen Shui-bian, 
but rather loyal to Beijing.”
236
 In the early days of Chen Shui-bian’s administration, a
large number of air force pilots resigned and became civilian pilots, causing a major 
229 Wei-chin Lee, “The Greening of the Brass: Taiwan’s Civil-Military Relations since 2000,” Asian









problem in air power.
237
 Furthermore, in 2003, a guest lecturer ridiculed the President at a
seminar in the military, with hundreds of active officers applauding.
238
 These events
indicate a problem with the control of the military by Chen Shui-bian.
239
In addition, soft coup
240
 incidents took place in 2004. The first incident occurred
on March 19, 2004, the day before the presidential election. Chen Shui-bian and Vice 
President Annette Lu were shot by an assassin during an election campaign stop in the 
Tainan area. As a result, Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu were injured and hospitalized, 
but they were not critical. In the presidential election the following day, Chen Shui-bian 
succeeded in re-election by about thirty thousand votes. In this case, defense minister 
Tang Yao-min was accused of attempting to assassinate Chen Shui-bian with generals 
from the Koumintang.
241
 Eventually, however, the case investigation concluded that an
assassin, Chen Ching-hung, was the sole cause. Another suspicion of soft coup
242
 activity
was raised at the end of 2004 from Chen Shui-bian.
243
 At that time, Chen Shui-bian
supported election of his party’s parliamentary candidates.
244
 He insisted, “The retired
generals persuaded active generals to resign or hospitalize, creating a sudden command 
void and creating a military crisis.”
245
 Chen Shui-bian did not take any legal action
against them, however.
246
Despite these difficulties, however, there had been important changes in civil-




240 On March 19, 2004, the day before the 2004 presidential election in Taiwan, the attempted
assassination of Chen Shui-bian, who was then president, took place. In this case, he was injured and 
hospitalized, and was elected on the next day by about 30,000 votes. 
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generals wanted to challenge his command and authority by inducing a security vacuum by hospitalizing or 






passed a law to reform the military structure.247 According to this law, the commanding 
power of the military changed from the chief of general staff to the defense minister.248 
The defense minister had also been given the authority to report directly to the 
President.249 In addition, the ministry of defense had to be monitored by congress.250 In 
detail, the law stipulated that the ministry of national defense should allow a third of its 
employees to be civilians and that one of the two vice ministers should be a civilian.251 
Second, Chen Shui-bian regulated the military intelligence bureau to act in accordance 
with legal procedures and report its activities regularly to parliament.252 The third change 
was the expansion of the NSC. It allowed the President and his civilian staff to plan and 
control defense policy.253 
As a result, civil-military relations in Taiwan have gone through difficulties but 
have moved toward democracy. In terms of the professionalism of the military, some of 
the former Koumintang soldiers acted against the president. 254  The Taiwan military 
generally accepted its Taiwanese independence policy that had been strongly opposed by 
the Koumintang, however by adjusting the level appropriately.255 “The mission of the 
armed forces is to protect the island of Taiwan.”256 Considering that the majority of the 
military commanders were from Koumintang at the time, it can be seen that Taiwan’s 
professionalism had developed. 
In terms of civilian control of the military, Chen Shui-bian improved the legal 
procedures for civilian control of the military and institutionalized military intelligence 












retirement, however.257 In addition, a third of the staff of the ministry of national defense 
were appointed as civilians, but many civilian positions were filled with reserve military 
officers.258 Furthermore, President Chen Shui-bian underwent two soft coups during his 
term. These suggest that he had a limitation to actually control the military. 
During the reign of Chen Shui-bian, overall civil-military relations in Taiwan 
gradually developed toward democratization, but Chen Shui-bian, a leader, had 
considerable difficulty in controlling the military. In particular, Chen Shui-bian himself 
said that a soft coup happened. It shows that it was not easy for the civilian leader to 
control the military. Taiwan’s dictatorship was not pressured by the resistance of millions 
of people. As a result, the military did not have a strong need for democratization or fear 
of the people. This could have contributed to the soft coups or ridicule of the civilian 
leader who did not fit the military’s view. 
B. CHANGES IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
This chapter analyzes the changing of civil-military relations of Taiwan during 
democratization, using Narcis Serra’s theoretical analysis framework and the historical 
background introduced in the preceding chapter. In the literature review, Serra argues that 
democratic transition occurs when democratically elected civilians end 
military intervention in the policy making process, because the military 
may themselves cease to intervene in, or the military privileges may be 
removed by civilian governments, and democratic consolidation occurs 
when elected civilian governments can establish and implement military 
and defense policies, and when the government is able to supervise the 
military whether the policies are properly implemented.259 
According to this, the democratic transition in Taiwan can be categorized as beginning 
during Lee Teng-hui’s regime. Lee Teng-hui’s regime had made it difficult for the 
military to intervene directly in politics as in the past. In 1993, the active soldiers were 





military from holding membership in certain political parties. 260  The regime also 
transferred all active military officers who worked in the civilian government back to the 
military.261 
The democratic consolidation can be categorized as occurring during the Chen 
Shui-bian regime. The Chen Shui-bian regime took legal actions to allow civilian 
governments to effectively control defense policies. The command structure of the 
military had been unified by the ministry of national defense, and a third of the staff of 
the ministry of defense had been filled by civilian employees.262 It also expanded the 
NSC’s capabilities and allowed the President and his staff to plan and control defense 
policies directly.263 
1. Democratic Transition Period—Lee Teng-hui Regime 
First, the conflict level axis, which is the vertical axis of Serra’s model, is 
considered a middle tension. Lee Teng-hui took power after the long-lasting Chiang Kai-
shek and Chiang Ching-kuo regimes. Lee Teng-hui joined the Koumintang in 1971 and 
served as minister of agriculture and prime minister of Taipei. Such a Koumintang career 
could have been a factor that helped the military to make a positive relation with the 
regime. Lee Teng-hui was a native Taiwanese, however. Therefore, he may have felt a 
sense of heterogeneity with the heads of the military, who are mostly from the Chinese 
mainland.264 In addition, he pursued relatively stronger democratic reforms than Chiang 
Ching-kuo. This would have created a tense relationship between him and the military. 
To be specific, Hau Pei-tsun, then prime minister of the Lee Teng-hui regime, former 
chief of the general staff, publicly objected to Lee Teng-hui’s policy.265 Lee Teng-hui 
refused to promote General Chiang Zonglin as a first-grade general because of Chiang’s 
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secret meeting with other military generals.266 Chiang had also opposed and threatened 
Lee Teng-hui on an official stage, saying, “It is unthinkable that the commander of the 
armed forces of the ROC would take no action when seeing the name of ROC being 
dropped.”
267
 In addition, in the 1996 election, major military leaders tried to inflict 
negative political damage to Lee Teng-hui by using a security crisis against China.268 
Nevertheless, during the Lee Teng-hui regime, the military did not engage in direct 
physical action. Considering all these actions, its level of conflict could be assessed as 
moderate. 
Next, look at the control of the military axis, which is the horizontal axis. First, in 
1993, all active soldiers withdrew from the Koumintang, and the law prohibited certain 
parties from participating in the military.269 It also prohibited active military personnel 
from participating in civilian government except in the security area.270 Considering this, 
it can be seen that the control of the military had been slightly improved as a whole, 
although there had been conflicts like that of Hau Pei-tsun, then prime minister, former 
chief of the general staff, who objected to and resisted the regime.271 
The last is the professionalism axis, which is the second horizontal axis. The 
leaders of the military had secret meetings with Hau Pei-tsun, then the prime minister and 
formerly chief of the general staff, in which participants were suspected of planning for a 
coup. 272  They also inflated the military crisis against China during the election to 
influence the regime.273 Tang Fei, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, declared that the 
military would defend the Constitution even as the nation’s character changed, however, 
and Chiang Chung-ling, defense minister, declared that the military would remain loyal 
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to the President and maintain political neutrality.274 In addition, all active soldiers were 
withdrawn from the Koumintang systematically and could not participate in civilian 
government except in the security area.275 This shows that professionalism had increased 
considerably. 
2. Democratic Consolidation Period—Chen Shui-bian Regime 
First, the conflict level axis, which is the vertical axis of Serra’s model, is 
considered continue middle tension. Overall, the military did not oppose the civilian 
government from using military force during the regime. In addition, they partly accepted 
the policy changes required by the civilian government and tried to minimize friction. 
Shortly after Chen Shui-bian’s regime, however, a large number of air force pilots 
applied for discharge, mocking the president in an official military lecture.276 There were 
also two soft coup cases suspected of intervention by the military.277 This indicates that 
their tense relationship had not been greatly mitigated. 
Second, look at the control of the military axis, which is the horizontal axis. Chen 
Shui-bian gave the commanding power to the Ministry of Defense for civilian control.278 
It also gave the minister of defense the right to report directly to the President.279 In 
addition, he made the system whereby congress could monitor the ministry of defense 
and the military intelligence bureau on a regular basis.280 The NSC also expanded its 
organization to allow the President to plan and implement Taiwan’s own defense 
policies.281 In addition, the president appointed a genuine civilian defense minister and 
ordered one-third of the staff of the ministry of defense to be filled with civilians.282 
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Despite these efforts, however, the genuine civilian minister of defense, whom he 
appointed, was not able to carry out any practical activities, and the civilian personnel of 
the ministry of defense were also filled with reservist soldiers.283 Also, as the two soft 
coup cases show, the civilian regime had difficulty in controlling the military. Even then, 
the presidential staff complained that some of the military seemed more loyal to the 
mainland than the president.284 In this regard, the control of the military axis can be 
considered slightly increased. 
The last remaining axis is the professionalism axis, which is the second horizontal 
axis. At that time, the main positions of the military were filled by members of the former 
Koumintang party, but they tried to accommodate the changes in defense policy required 
by the regime. In particular, in response to the civilian government’s Taiwan 
independence policy, the military declared its mission to protect “the island of Taiwan” 
rather than the Republic of China.285 A large number of Air Force pilots had left the 
military as a backlash against Chen Shui-bian, however, and some higher ranking 
military members were suspected of involvement in two soft coups.286 Considering this, 
the professionalism axis can be considered to have risen slightly. 
These changes in civil-military relations during democratization in Taiwan are 






Figure 3.  Changes in civil-military relations during democratization in 
Taiwan.287 
C. MAJOR IMPLICATIONS 
As a result of democratization, Taiwan’s civil-military relations have suffered 
difficulties while making a significant change during the democratization process. Chiang 
Ching-kuo abolished the martial law in 1987, and in 1990, Lee Teng-hui became the first 
native Taiwanese president. He tried to make the military be an independent army from 
the Koumintang and excluded soldiers from the civilian administration.288 Chen Shui-
bian was elected president in 2000, when he was the first in Taiwan to replace the 
Koumintang regime. In an effort to institutionalize the civilian control, he tried to unify 
the military command as a minister of national defense, expand the functions of the NSC, 
and appoint a civilian defense minister.289 




In the process, however, military and former military key figures publicly 
opposed the President’s policies and mocked the President. In particular, during the Chen 
Shui-bian regime, there were two soft coup cases suspected of involvement in the 
military. 290  This suggests that the process of democratization in Taiwan has not 
progressed steadily. 
Applying Serra’s theory of military reform, the conflict level axis remained in the 
middle state, and the control of the military axis rose slightly in both regimes. And the 
professional axis seems to have risen considerably in the Lee Teng-hui regime, but only 
slightly in the Chen Shui-bian regime. 
These changes are related to the characteristics of the democratization process in 
Taiwan. In Taiwan, in 1979, the Kaohsiung Incident happened. Hundreds of citizens 
demanded democracy and more than a hundred citizens were arrested by the police. This 
was a meaningful event that caused the desire for democratization in Taiwan, which was 
under the control of martial law for a long period of time. After this event, however, the 
democratization movement, in which the majority of the people participated, did not 
progress smoothly or steadily. Although Chiang Ching-kuo ended martial law in 1987, 
there seemed to be other reasons for his decision to accept democracy besides the 
pressure of citizens, such as diplomatic pressure or personal preference.291 After him, Lee 
Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese who favored democracy, became the president by an 
internal decision of the Koumintang.292 The Wild Lily student movement happened at the 
beginning of the regime, but participants were mainly Taipei’s college students. During 
the reign of Lee Teng-Hui, there was no nationwide democratization movement. 
Therefore, this made an environment that allowed Taiwan’s military to cope with the 
civilian leader’s democratic policies relatively flexibly without fear of the civilian 
movement. 
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These changes in Taiwan’s civil-military relations are also related to the 
effectiveness and the incentives that the new civil-military relations theory emphasizes. 
First of all, in the perspective of effectiveness, the Lee Teng-hui regime changed into an 
offensive military strategy to defend the island of Taiwan.293 This can be regarded as a 
realistic military strategy, realizing that the Taiwanese military cannot occupy the 
Chinese mainland themselves. Taiwan could not obtain the necessary weapons, however, 
due to the negative attitude of the United States concerned about China’s opposition and 
the conflict with the Koumintang in parliament during the Chen Shui-bian regime.294 
This limited Taiwanese military effectiveness. Looking at the incentives, Lee Teng-hui, 
although from the Koumintang, was a native Taiwanese. He, therefore, did not feel the 
necessity of a “single China” principle and the strong public security politics that the 
Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo regimes had maintained. Chen Shui-bian was 
also a former human rights lawyer and participated in the Kaohsiung Incident. He saw the 
necessity of democratization and the necessity of change in civil-military relations. The 
relationship with China led to conflicts as the Taiwan government pursued an 
independence policy. Therefore, external threats at this time were high and internal 
threats were stable, but there was always a risk of military challenge. Therefore, there 
was a middle state incentive to change civilian relations for civilian leaders, but it was not 
an optimistic environment. 
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Soviet Research 35, no. 2 (2011): 141–173. 
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V. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
A. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN’S 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING DEMOCRATIZATION 
The two countries have experienced considerable changes in civil-military 
relations in terms of their institutions. The militaries of the two countries had a powerful 
influence on politics and society before democratization. In particular, soldiers entered 
the civilian administration and the parliament as active soldiers or reservists, and chose 
the main policy of the state. Furthermore, the military themselves decided and enforced 
their policies. 
When democratization began in both countries, the civil-military relations also 
went through a process of democratization in the vortex of change. In the process of 
change, the two countries institutionalized civilian control of the military. Specifically, 
policies established control of the military for a civilian president and have made it 
possible for the parliament to monitor the military. In addition, active soldiers have been 
unable to operate in civilian governments in areas except the security area. The influence 
of the reservists of the government and the congress have significantly diminished. Also, 
the soldiers themselves have also improved professionalism to try to accommodate the 
changes demanded by civilian leaders and regimes. In particular, the military in both 
countries did not oppose the civilian regime by using direct military power during the 
democratization process. This commonality is also reflected in results of applying Serra’s 
theory. In both countries, the control of the military axis and the professional axis appear 
to improve overall in both the democratic transition and the democratic consolidation 
period. 
B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN’S CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS DURING DEMOCRATIZATION 
First, in South Korea, President Kim Young-sam took office in 1993 as the first 
genuine civilian since the long military regime. President Kim Young-sam removed 
Hanahoe, a private organization that had a strong influence in the military after his 
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inauguration,295 and conducted a survey of military personnel and corruption that had 
been hidden.296  In addition, he arrested Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, former 
Presidents, and generals who took power by raising coups and massacring innocent 
civilians in Gwangju. 297  Also, he banned the military intelligence agency’s civilian 
inspections that had been done in the past.298 In the meantime, the military did not 
engage in open opposition or armed resistance. The South Korean military conforms to 
the instructions of the civilian president. 
In the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun presidential regimes, civil-military 
relations worsened. Although Kim Young-sam was the first genuine civilian elected after 
a long period of military dictatorship, he was elected president as a candidate of the 
political party (Democratic Liberty Party) including military dictatorship groups such as 
Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo. As a democratization activist, however, President 
Kim Dae-jung had been on the other side of the military regime during his entire life, and 
was almost killed by the Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan regimes. President Roh 
Moo-hyun also took the lead in the struggle for democratization as a human rights 
lawyer. As a congress member, he opposed Kim Young-sam’s political merger with the 
military dictatorship group. He also took a lead and became a star in criticizing the 
military dictatorship at the parliamentary hearing in 1988. Furthermore, from a policy 
perspective, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun attempted to solve the North Korea 
problem through dialogue, exchange and cooperation. These parts could be a conflicting 
element between the civilian government and the military.299 The military, however, as 
during Kim Young-sam’s regime, chose to adapt rather than resist the civilian regime. 
The military accepted the government’s policy of reconciliation with North Korea and 
implemented measures to alleviate tensions with North Korea. 300  In particular, the 








North Korea, which even caused a criticism of the military from conservative medias in 
South Korea. The military also accepted control of the civilian government through an 
expansion of the NSC and monitoring function by the National Assembly.301 Of course, 
there were some noises of opposition to this process, but they were only complaints 
expressed among some military members and leaked through media and reserve 
organizations. The personnel or organization of the military did not officially act against 
government policies or express their opposition to the public. 
In Taiwan, however, a different image often appeared. After a long period of the 
reign of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-Kuo in Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, who gained 
power in 1988, transformed the military from the Koumintang army into a national army. 
He passed laws that prevented certain political parties from directly controlling the army, 
and prevented active soldiers from taking positions in the Koumintang.302 In addition, 
active soldiers could not operate in the civilian government except for security-related 
areas.303 Also, he appointed the first genuine civilian minister of national defense in 
Taiwan’s history in 1990.304 As for Lee Teng-hui’s reform policies, though the military 
did not mobilize direct military force, they caused considerable resistance. The former 
joint chief of staff, Hau Pei-tsun, was then prime minister. He refused to implement the 
military reform policies, and criticized the policies to the public.305 He also had a secret 
meeting with incumbent military leaders.306 It is doubtful, however, that he intended to 
start an actual coup.307 The Taiwanese security agencies had also pushed for a security 
crisis to intervene in the presidential election in 1996.308 
The first regime change took place in Taiwan through the 2000 presidential 
election. Chen Shui-bian, a former Democrat and a human rights activist, was elected 
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president. His election was able to bring a crisis to civilian relations than Lee Teng-hui’s 
regime period. Chen Shui-bian was a human rights lawyer who had fought for the 
democratization movement since the Kaohsiung Incident, and he also wanted to make 
Taiwan an independent country from China.309  These were repulsive factors for the 
people who had been ruled by the Koumintang for a long time. In fact, when Chen Shui-
bian took power as president, pilots who were relatively free to change jobs among the 
soldiers applied for retirement.310 This not only hurt Taiwan’s air power, but also put 
political pressure on the president. In addition, the Taiwanese military publicly ridiculed 
the president during an official event.311 Above all, the Taiwan military was suspected of 
involvement in two soft coup events during the reign of Chen Shui-bian. One time, the 
military were suspected of trying to assassinate Chen Shui-bian, and another time, the 
high-ranking military generals were suspected of denying their duties as a group and 
trying to hinder the president’s performance.312 
Why did this difference appear? The origin of the democratization movement in 
South Korea can be found even before the foundation of government. The Donghak 
Peasant Movement, which occurred during the Chosun dynasty in 1886, did not have a 
specific institutional slogan of democracy, but hundreds of thousands of peasants 
participated nationwide in the battle against the government forces. The peasants 
advocated abolition of the class system and equality and human rights. After this 
movement, the Independent Association, which was established in 1896, organized the 
People’s Mass Meeting to spread democratic values such as freedom, human rights, 
equality, division of powers, and establishment of a parliamentary system.313 Later, in 
1919, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea instituted a democratic and 
republican constitution according to the influence of the Independent Association.314 
After the foundation of the country, the April 19
th
 Revolution occurred in 1960 and 
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hundreds of thousands protested against an authoritarian regime. Although the military 
coups and dictatorial regimes continued for decades after the revolution, the 
democratization movement continued in the meantime. Especially, in the 1970s, rapid 
economic growth led to the expansion of a middle class, and the authoritarian rule 
sparked dissatisfaction within the society and caused a commitment to a democratization 
movement.315 In particular, tens of thousands of protesters participated in the Bu-ma 
Demonstrations in 1979 in the Busan and Masan areas, which resisted the dictatorship of 
the Park Chung-hee regime. This case is considered to have had a great impact on the fall 
of the Park Chung-hee regime. Also during the Chun Doo-hwan regime, the Gwangju 
Democratization Movement occurred in 1980, and hundreds of thousands of Gwangju 
citizens resisted the bloody suppression by the authoritarian regime and fought an armed 
struggle. In addition, a democratization uprising broke out in June 1987. Millions of 
citizens participated in the demonstrations nationwide and endeavored to end the 
dictatorship. On June 29, 1987, President Chun Doo-hwan accepted a direct presidential 
election system and the long-term military dictatorship ended. 
The history of the South Korean democratization movement seems to have 
affected the civil-military relations during democratization. South Korean have fostered 
the value of democracy on their own, through a long-term democratic movement. 
Recognition of the importance of democracy reached a peak in the June Democratic 
Movement in June 1987, when millions of citizens protested against the authoritarian 
regime for one month. This change in perception has contributed to two major aspects in 
the South Korean military’s acceptance of civil-military relations. First, the soldiers 
themselves became positive about democratization. The South Korean military has been a 
conscription system, and the lower-class officers (mainly lieutenants) and soldiers, who 
occupy the majority of the members, come to the military to perform military service 
obligations for a short period of time. These young people were able to see and listen and 
experience the democratization movement in society, and to hold the importance of 
democratization during military service. In addition, senior officers who had been in the 
military for a long time were also able to have a chance to change their perceptions 
315 Chang-jip Choi, ibid.
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indirectly through family, friends, or the media, although they did not participate in the 
direct democratization movement. This aspect has helped the military members 
voluntarily accept democratization of civil-military relations. The second aspect of 
change is the pressure on the democratization of the citizens. The main commanders of 
the military had watched for a long period of resistance against the military dictatorship. 
In particular, in 1980, citizens of Gwangju voluntarily organized an armed militia against 
martial law forces. On May 27, 1980, when the martial law forces suppressed the militia 
stationed in the Jeonnam Provincial Government Office, the militia resisted to the end, 
even though they knew they would not be able to avoid death. In addition, soldiers 
watched millions of civilians go out on the streets against the military regime in June 
1987. Hence, major military commanders had to worry about the backward winds that 
could come upon them when they made decisions that countered democratic changes in 
civil-military relations. They had to take not just a power struggle with the civilian 
government, but a struggle with millions of citizens. Of course, in this situation, the 
military could use its own exclusive force to oppress the civilian government and 
citizens. Military commanders had to doubt whether their young subordinate members 
would obey their orders, however, because of the aforementioned factor. Furthermore, 
they also had to consider that their decisions would be at the expense of citizens’ armed 
resistance, as in the past at Gwangju. This potential instability contributed to the decision 
of the main commanders of the military to accept rather than resist the democratization of 
civil-military relations. Especially, when the democratization movement ended military 
dictatorship and the perpetrators were punished, the military became aware of what a 
political intervention was leading to. 
The process of democratization in Taiwan had differences from that of South 
Korea. First of all, there are diverse decisive factors for democratization with people’s 
resistance such as international pressure and preference of political leaders.316 Chiang 
Ching-kuo announced in December 1985 that he would not pass his power to his family, 
316 Chong-pin Lin and Man-jung Mignon Chan, “Taiwan and Mainland: A Comparison on
Democratization,” World Affairs 155, no. 3 (2017): 123–124. 
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and in July 1987 he ended the martial law that had lasted from 1947.317  Also, the 
Taiwanese people were allowed to visit relatives in mainland China in October 1987, and 
the restrictions on the media were relaxed in January 1988.318 The cause of why he 
actively embraced democracy is not known exactly.319 Scholars generally suppose the 
following three, however: first, the increase of the citizens’ democracy movement; 
second, the diplomatic isolation caused by the growth of China and the pressure on the 
improvement of human rights from the United States; and third, Chiang Ching-kuo’s 
preference to stop his dictatorship. Unlike South Korea, these three factors together seem 
to have played an important role in Taiwan, rather than any one of them being 
overwhelming. Chiang Ching-kuo’s series of reforms for democratization surprised even 
the key agents of the Koumintang at that time.320 After Chiang Ching-kuo’s death, Lee 
Teng-hui, who was then the deputy prime minister, succeeded to power. Lee, a native 
Taiwanese, tried to eliminate the dictatorship and authoritarian elements that had 
remained in the country, and he continued the democratic reform so that the people could 
directly elect a national leader.  
In Taiwan, the reason why the people’s democratization movement did not, 
relatively speaking, actively happen was the strict authoritarian rule of the Koumintang. 
The Koumintang slaughtered tens of thousands of the native Taiwanese in 1947 by 
sending troops from mainland China in the February 28th Incident. The Koumintang 
declared martial law after withdrawing to the island of Taiwan in 1949. The martial law 
restricting the political freedom of the people guaranteed by the Constitution lasted for 
thirty-eight years until Chiang Ching-kuo lifted it in 1987. According to Fulda, the rule of 
the Koumintang was no different from the colonial rule of Japan for Taiwan.321 The 
Kuomintang discriminated against Taiwanese as secondary citizens, and the 
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modernization of the Taiwan islands was not meant for Taiwanese, but for their original 
purpose as a means to advance into the mainland.322  During the martial period, the 
Koumintang restricted citizens’ freedom in various ways.323 The Koumintang gave the 
press guidelines to the press, and they arrested the journalists.324 The Koumintang also 
prohibited citizens from participating in any kind of demonstration activities such as 
massive marches, street protests, and strikes. 325  During the martial law period, the 
Taiwanese never elected their own presidents.326 The Koumintang even executed about 
3,000 political prisoners during the martial law period.327 Therefore, since these political 
oppressions of the Koumintang gave fear to the opposition, the democratization activists 
in Taiwan controlled and restrained themselves not to make a national democratic 
movement. 328  Tien argued that, compared to South Korean democrats, Taiwanese 
democrats held relatively mild struggles against the regime.329 
Therefore, in Taiwan, the democratization movement did not actively take place 
compared with South Korea. In 1947, the February 28th Incident occurred before the 
Koumintang entered Taiwan in earnest. Hundreds of thousands of native Taiwanese 
protested against the repressive rule of the Koumintang. During this process, the 
Koumintang army slaughtered tens of thousands of native Taiwanese. This incident was a 
conflict between indigenous people and immigrant people who oppressed the indigenous. 
After this incident, a national democratization movement did not actively take place in 
Taiwan for a long time. Many years later, the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979 made a big 
impact on the democratization of Taiwan, but only hundreds of people participated, and 
only in the Kaohsiung area. In 1990, the Wild Lily movement occurred, but the 
participants were mainly university students in a capital city. 
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The democratization movement in Taiwan has a meaningful history. But it did not 
have a history of nationwide protest, in which a majority of the population participated, 
like South Korea. The difference between South Korea and Taiwan’s democratization 
movement can help explain the unrest in Taiwan’s civil-military relations during the 
democratization process. The comparative weakness of Taiwan’s national 
democratization movement created a lack of stimulus to actively accept the 
democratization of civil-military relations in the military. Because the military members 
did not feel the need for democracy themselves, they did not need to actively accept 
changes in civil-military relations that could be disadvantageous to them. Also, there was 
little social pressure to force the military to make changes. In the process of 
democratization in Taiwan, there was no armed struggle of citizens or national resistance 
like South Korea, so that soldiers could consider that even if they rejected the change of 
civil-military relations, they would not face a serious crisis internally. In other words, 
since the perception of the necessity and inevitability of democratization itself seems to 
be lower, Taiwan’s military had some maneuvering room for their actions.  
By applying Serra’s model, South Korea’s conflict level axis decreased from the 
democratic consolidation period through the democratic transition period. This figure 
increased gradually in Taiwan through the democratic transition and consolidation 
periods, however. Furthermore, though both the professionalism axis and the control of 
military axis rose during the democratic transition and consolidation period in both 
countries, the rises in South Korea were higher than in Taiwan. Figure 4 compares the 
changes in civil-military relations during democratization in South Korea and Taiwan. 
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Figure 4.  Comparing changes in civil-military relations during democratization 
in South Korea and Taiwan.330 
330 Adapted from Serra, 64.
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VI. CONCLUSION 
On May 10, 2017, Moon Jae-in was elected president in the election in South 
Korea, after the impeachment of former president Park Geun-hye. He visited the ministry 
of defense on May 18, shortly after his election to the presidency, received reports from 
the military commander, and reaffirmed his security commitment. On May 30, however, 
Yoon Young-chan, the chief of the national communication department in the 
presidential office, said the ministry of defense deliberately missed a report about the 
additional deployment of four THAAD missile launchers. The presidential office 
surveyed key military personnel, including the then minister of defense, Han Min-gu, 
who was appointed by the former president. Given that the THAAD issue331  was a 
sensitive issue in the security surrounding the Korean peninsula, the incident has brought 
a significant wave. After the dispute, President Moon Jae-in appointed Song Young-moo, 
a former chief of the navy, as minister of national defense, and Chung Kyung-doo, then 
chief of the air force, was appointed to the joint chiefs of staff. Significant changes are 
anticipated, given that both positions have usually been held by the army. 
On May 20, 2016, Tsai Ing-wen was elected president in Taiwan. She became the 
first female president in Taiwan and the second Democratic Progressive Party president. 
Her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, who was from the Koumintang, had maintained a 
relatively friendly relationship with the military. Since Tsai was a woman in Taiwan, 
however, where every man was obliged to military service, she had no military 
experience. In addition, Tsai supported a policy of Taiwan independence that the military 
has not favored. After she took office, Tsai ordered the military to reform the military 
strategy and culture in August 2016. Tsai criticized the Taiwanese military for its 
improper remnants of the Koumintang army, and advised the Taiwanese military to re-
                                                 
331 THAAD is an acronym for “Terminal High Altitude Area Defense” and is a ballistic intercept 
missile system developed for U.S. military use. The debate began in South Korea in June 2014, when the 
USFK Commander said there was a need to deploy THAAD in South Korea to defend against missile 
attacks by North Korea. While China and Russia strongly oppose THAAD’s deployment on the Korean 
peninsula, Park Geun-hye’s government decided to deploy it in July 2016. 
66 
establish their reason for existence and the object to be countered. 332  After Donald 
Trump became president of the United States at the end of 2016, then President-elect 
Trump held a telephone conversation with president Tsai. This was the highest-level call 
made in thirty-seven years after the two countries broke official diplomatic relations. Tsai 
also officially traveled to the United States while visiting Latin America. 
The internal and external security situations of these two countries are expected to 
have a considerable impact on civil-military relations. It is also likely that civil-military 
relations would affect them and their leaders’ performances. 
In this paper, Narcis Serra’s theory of military reform has been used to analyze 
the development process of civil-military relations in South Korea and Taiwan during 
their democratization. The development processes of the two countries had both 
commonalities and differences. This study also looked at the history of the 
democratization movements of the two countries as a possible cause of the differences in 
their marches toward democracy. 
The democratic transition of South Korea can be regarded as beginning with the 
election of President Kim Young-sam. He purged Hanahoe, a private organization that 
had a strong influence in the army, and punished former presidents and generals who 
caused military coups and slaughtered civilians. 333  South Korea’s democratic 
consolidation period occurred during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun regimes. The 
two presidents created the NSC and expanded its capabilities to allow the President to 
effectively control defense policy. 334  Also, they tried to increase the proportion of 
civilian employees in the department of defense.335 During the democratization of South 
Korea, the military actively accepted reforms rather than resisting the civilian presidents. 
The reason for the military’s choice seems to be the influence over a long period of the 
extensive democratization movement in South Korea. Applying Serra’s theory, the 
332 Minnie Chan, “Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen Orders Revamp of Military Strategy, Weapons Upgrade,”





conflict level axis remained stable during the democratization period, and the control axis 
of the military gradually shifted toward civilian control. The professional axis shifted to 
increasing military professionalism. 
Taiwan’s democratic transition period can be classified as taking place during the 
Lee Teng-hui regime. He carried out reforms that changed the military from the 
Koumintang army into the national army.336 He also appointed the first genuine civilian 
defense minister in Taiwan’s history.337  The democratic consolidation period can be 
considered to be the Chen Shui-bian regime. He created the NSC that allowed the 
president to control the defense policy, and allocated the ratio of civilian staffs in the 
department of defense by law.338 During this period, the Taiwanese military did not resist 
the civilian president directly by using military force, and tried to accept the policies of 
the civilian government. A high-ranking official from the military did not accept the 
civilian president’s policy, however, and made a secret meeting with other generals.339 
Furthermore, soldiers mocked the civilian president during an official event. 340  In 
addition, two soft coups occurred.341 Applying Serra’s theory, while the control of the 
military axis and the professional axis increased gradually for civilian control and 
military professionalism during Taiwan’s democratic transition and consolidation period, 
they were not higher than those of South Korea. Furthermore, the conflict level axis 
rather increased during both periods and did not approach a stable state like South Korea. 
The difference in the democratization process between the two countries’ civil-
military relations seems to be due to the differences in the process of democratization 
between the two countries. In the case of South Korea, during the process of 
democratization, citizens voluntarily aided the national democratic movement against the 
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against military forces. Millions of citizens from across the country came out on the street 
every day and campaigned for democracy. South Korean dictators were forced to adopt 
democracy under the pressure of these citizens. This South Korean democratization 
movement not only made soldiers aware of the importance of democratization 
voluntarily, but also reminded them of the social pressure that they should bear if they 
accepted the democratization of civil-military relations passively. In the case of Taiwan, 
there was a voluntary democratization movement of citizens, but there were also other 
main factors such as international pressure and political leaders’ preferences. The strict 
social controls of the Koumintang in Taiwan had limited citizens’ voluntary democracy 
movements. This characteristic of the Taiwanese democratization process created a 
shortage of incentives that would allow the military to actively accept changes in civil-
military relations that could have a negative effect on them. In addition, the Taiwan 
military did not worry too much about the storm from society after it had blown over, 
even if they accepted the change of civil-military relations passively. For these reasons, 
the Taiwanese military did not actively accept the democratization of civil-military 
relations as much as South Koreans. 
This study is an area where prior research has made little progress. Therefore, this 
research can be a starting point in this field. In the past, many authoritarian countries 
have undergone and are undergoing a process of democratization. In the future, 
authoritarian or totalitarian nations like North Korea can also undergo a process of 
democratization. This study could contribute to analyzing the civil-military relations of 
such countries in the future. 
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